Ofuscación de código utilizando generadores de números pseudoaleatorios

Code obfuscation using pseudo-random number generators

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John Aycock University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada
Juan M. Gutiérrez Investigador Independiente, Arequipa, Peru
Daniel M. Nunes University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada
Resumen

Se describe un nuevo método para la ofuscación de códigos maliciosos que utiliza códigos ya presentes en los sistemas: un generador de números pseudo-aleatorios. Esto también puede verse como una técnica anti-desmontaje y anti-depuración, dependiendo de su despliegue, debido a que el código real no existe hasta su ejecución - que se genera de forma dinámica por el generador de números pseudo-aleatorios. Se han usado xperimentos de todo un año para demostrar que esta técnica de ofuscación es viable para un adversario malicioso con acceso a una gran potencia computacional.

 

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Biografía del autor/a / Ver

John Aycock, University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada

Department of Computer Science University of Calgary 2500 University Drive NW Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4

Daniel M. Nunes, University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada

Department of Computer Science University of Calgary 2500 University Drive NW Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4.
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